Property--Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Made on the Land of Another by Watson, James R.
Volume 72 
Issue 1 Issues 1 & 2 Article 23 
February 1970 
Property--Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Made on the 
Land of Another 
James R. Watson 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James R. Watson, Property--Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Made on the Land of Another, 72 W. 
Va. L. Rev. (1970). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/23 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
case presents a good example of the judiciary taking a hand in
the protection. An even more recent attempt at control can be
seen in the recently adopted regulations of the Federal Trade
Commission, providing for full disclosure in gasoline and super-
market give-away games Concern has been expressed at both the
state and national levels. A consumer's choice of product or out-
let could be based, not on the quality he receives, but on what he
may be able to win "just for stopping in."
Where is it all going to end? Or is it? The answer may lie
with the courts, as indicated by the Schillberg decision. West Virgin-
ia has already initiated the lottery approach in attacking the "bank
night" promotions, and could conceivably use this as a stepping-off
point on the road to consumer protection against the more modern
schemes. But if the consideration element should become a major
obstacle, then perhaps legislative action might be desirable-for
regulation of fair and honest trade practices.
George William Lavender, III
Property-Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Made
on the Land of Another
The plaintiff Somerville and defendant Jacobs owned adjacent
lots in the city of Parkersburg. Apparently relying on a surveyor's
report and plat, plaintiff had a warehouse built on what he thought
was one of his lots. The warehouse, however, was mistakenly con-
structed upon the defendant's property. Plaintiff then instituted a
proceeding for equitable relief in the circuit court. The trial court
entered judgment for the plaintiff and decreed that the defend-
ant either buy the warehouse for $17,500, have judgment entered
against him for that amount, or convey the lot upon which the
building was constructed to the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.
Held, judgment affirmed. A person, who through a reasonable mis-
take of fact constructs a building entirely upon the land of another,
'34 Fed. Reg. 13302 (1969).
[Vol. 72
1
Watson: Property--Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Made on the Land o
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970
CASE COMMENTS
and supposing in good faith that such land is his, is entitled to
recover the value of the improvements and to a lien upon such pro-
perty to enforce payment, or to purchase the land so improved at
its pre-improvement value, even though the true owner is free
from any inequitable conduct. Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E. 2d 805
(W. Va. 1969).
At common law an occupier who, under a mistaken but bona
fide belief that he was the owner of certain real estate, made im-
provements on it, had no right to compensation from the true
owner.1 As the common law developed, however, the courts began
to permit the occupier to assert the improvements as a set-off
against rents, profits or damages claimed in a suit by the owner.n 2
The courts of equity concurrently began to adopt the more lenient
civil law rule which required the owner who sought the aid of
equity to recover possession or establish ownership to make com-
pensation for the occupier's improvements on the equitable prin-
ciple that "he who seeks equity must do equity."3
In Virginia the equitable principle which allowed the bona
fide improver compensation was extended by statute in 1831.4 The
Virginia statute provides that any defendant against whom a
decree or judgment has been rendered for land has the right to
petition the court for compensation for improvements which were
"'At the common law one was under no obligations to pay for unauthorized
improvements made on his land, and one making them without his knowledge
or consent could not recover therefor, even though he acted under a bona fide
belief of ownership." Holmes v. Holt, 93 Kan. 7, 24, 142 P. 369, 375 (1914). See,
e.g., Boswell v. Hadfield, 202 Ark. 200, 149 S.W.2d 555 (1941); Kester v. Bost-
wick, 153 Fla. 437, 15 So. 2d 201 (1943); Bigelow v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 206
Iowa 884, 221 N.W. 661 (1928).
"'That rule is, that meliorations of the property, (which, necessarily, mean
valuable and lasting improvements,) made at the expense of the occupant of
the land, shall be set off against the legal claim of the proprietor for profits
which have accrued to the occupant during his possession." Green v. Biddle, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 82 (182). See, e.g., Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-
Op., 121 Mont. 1, 190 P. 2d 55 (1948) ; Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 25
S.E.2d 167 (1943); Parker v. Daly, 58 Ore. 564, 114 P.926 (1911).
"'Consistent with the policy that he who seeks equity must do equity, the
rule has been established that when the true owner seeks relief in equity . . .
and where improvements upon real estate . . . are made in good faith by one
in possession, believing himself to be a bona fide purchaser or owner . . . al-
lowance may be made for the increased or enhanced value caused by the improve-
ments .... " Hayes v. Davis, 307 Ill. App. 440, 444, 30 NE_. 2d 521, 522 (1940).
See, e.g., Engsign v. Batterson, 68 Conn. 298, 36 A. 51 (1896); Putnam v. Tyler,
117 Pa. 570, 12 A. 43 (1888).
4See VA. CODE AN. § 8-842 (Michie 1957); Dawson v. Grow, 29 W. Va. 33a,
336, 1 S.E. 564, 566 (1887).
1970]
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made upon another's land in good faith. The present West Vir-
ginia statute is patterned after the Virginia one.5 The statutes of
both states are qualified, limiting recovery only to defendants who
have made improvements in good faith. In Somerville, however,
the improver initiated the suit asking for equitable relief. The
court ruled that since the improver had not previously been a de-
fendant in an action by the owner he was beyond the scope of the
statute.6
Since the improvements statute was inapplicable, the court
turned its attention to numerous cases which allowed the improver
to instsitute his own cause of action for mistaken improvements.
The court found that several cases:
recognize and sustain the jurisdiction of a court of equity
to award compensation to the improver to prevent unjust
enrichment to the owner and in the alternative to require
the owner to convey the land to the improver upon his
payment to the owner of the fair value of the land less the
improvements7
Apparently the earliest reported case in the United States sus-
taining such an equitable principle was Bright v. Boyd.8 In this
case a bona fide purchaser who had made permanent improve-
ments on another's property was entitled to bring his own action
for compensation after the true owner had recovered the premises
at law. Not only did the improver bring his own suit, but he also
was declared to have a right to full compensation or lien upon
the property for the value of the improvements. Since the Bright
decision, several jurisdictions have permitted the improver to main-
W. VA. CoDE ch. 55, art. 5 § 1 (Michie 1966):
Any defendant against whom a decree or judgment shall be rendered
for land, where no assessment of damage has been made .. . may, at
any time before the execution of the decree or judgment, present a
petition to the court . . . stating that he or those under whom he
claims, while holding the premises under a title believed by him or
them to be good, have made permanent improvements thereon, and pray-
ing that he may be allowed for the same the fair and reasonable
value thereof...
'Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E. 2d 805, 807 (W. Va. 1969). "That statute has no
application to the facts of this case, and this case, for that reason is not within the
statute."
Id. at 807.
84 F. Cas. 127 (No. 1875) (C.C. Me. 1841), opinion on entry of final decree
4 F. Cas. 134 (No. 1876) (C.C. Me. 1843).
[Vol. 72
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tain his own suit.9 On the other hand, some jurisdictions deny the
improver a right to action altogether 0 while some jurisdictions
qualify such independent action."
In Somerville the majority and minority basically disagreed
over conflicting policy matters and the interpretation of case law.
The majority opinion stressed the degree of hardship incurred by
a bona fide improver 2 and conversely the degree of unjust en-
richment incurred by the true owner.'8 On the other hand, the
dissenting opinion stressed that the majority opinion resulted in
a taking of private property for private use.' 4 The dissenting op-
pinion also discussed the principle that as between two innocent
parties the one who made the mistake should suffer the hardship
rather than he who was without fault. 8
The majority opinion in Somerville, in expounding the unjust
enrichment argument, relied heavily on a similar New Jersey case,
McKelway v. Armour 8 for the proposition that the owner of the
improved property must either buy the building or sell the property
to the bona fide improver. It was the majority's view that the
'See, e.g., Pull v. Barnes, 142 Colo. 272, 350 P. 2d 828 (1960); Schleicher v.
Schleicher, 120 Conn. 528, 182 A. 162 (1936); Olin v. Reinecke, 336 I1. 530, 168
N.E. 676 (1929); Union Hall Ass'n v. Morrison, 39 Md. 281 (1873); Hardy v.
Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930); Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt,
266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E. 2d 434 (1966).
"See, e.g., White v. Stokes, 67 Ark. 184, 5a S.W. 1060 (1899); Putnam v.
Ritchie, 6 Paige 390 (N.Y. 1837).
'See, e.g., Barton v. National Land Co., 27 Kan. 634 (1882) (in court's dis-
cretion); Wilie v. Brooks, 45 Miss. 542 (1871) (equity having already ob-
tained jurisdiction).
"Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E. 2d 805, 813 (W. Va. 1969). "[B]y the retention
of the building by the defendant the plaintiff.. . will suffer a total loss of the
amount of the value of the building."
'3Id. at 813. "fIlf the defendants retain the building and refuse to pay any
sum as compensation to plaintiff ... they will be unjustly enriched in the
amount of $17,500.00, the agreed value of the building ....1"
"Id. at 817. "[Flor the court to permit the plaintiff to force the defendants
to sell their property contrary to their wishes is unthinkable and unpardonable.
This is nothing less than condemnation of private property for private use."
'Id. at 817. "It clearly is the accepted law that as between two parties in the
circumstances of this case he who made the mistake must suffer the hardship
rather than he who was without fault."
110 N.J.Eq. 115 (Ch. Ct. 1854). Plaintiff erected a valuable dwelling house
on defendant's land by mistake. Defendant saw work progress from day to day
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later New Jersey case of Kirchner v. Miller1 7 did not overrule
McKelway as had been stated in a previous West Virginia case,
Cautley v. Morgan.s The majority not only distinguished between
the two New Jersey cases both as to the facts and the amount of
hardship involved, 9 but also distinguished Cautley from Somerville
on similar grounds. Cautley was distinguished from Somerville prin-
cipally on the ground that the improver in Cautley would suffer
relatively insignificant hardship if not compensated, while the
improver in Somerville would lose the entire cost of the build-
ing.20 The court also appeared to make one other significant point
of distinction between the two West Virginia cases. The court
stated that the plaintiff in Cautley had sufficient data to enable
her to avoid a mistake, but that she did not make proper use of
such available data. The court distinguished Cautley from
Somerville for this reason and implied that the erroneous surveyor's
report, 2 which failed to provide Somerville with accurate data,
1139 N.J.Eq. 355 (Ch. Ct. 1885). Plaintiff hired a surveyor to locate the
dividing line between plaintiff's property and that of defendant. The surveyor
mislocated the line and as a consequence plaintiff built a small house a few in-
ches onto defendant's land. The court held that equity would not enjoin an
ejectment action by defendant against plaintiff.
151 W. Va. 304, 41 S.E. 201 (1902). Plaintiff had a contractual right to
build a wall 10 inches onto defendant's property. After the wall was built it
was discovered that the wall was 16 inches on defendant's property. Defendant
brought ejectment action against plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a bill to have
defendant's ejectment action enjoined. The court held that equity would not
enjoin the ejectment action.
"In McKelway an entire building was built on another's property while in
Kirchner only a five inch strip fifteen feet long of a house was on the adjoining
landowner's property. Also, in McKelway the cost of removal would have been
for the whole house, while in Kirchner the cost of removal was estimated to be
under one hundred dollars.
'In Cautley the improver encroached only six inches on the adjacent
landowner's property and consequently the wall's removal would have been a
relatively insignificant hardship. However, in Somerville the improver located
his building, valued at $17,500, entirely on the defendant's property. Addition-
ally, the building in Somerville was constructed of solid concrete blocks on a
concrete slab which presented an extremely difficult job of removal without
destruction of the building.
'Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.F.2d 805, 815 (W. Va. 1969). "[T]he plaintiff,
[in Cautley] by not making proper use of available data, was guilty of careless
or negligent conduct in making the mistake." (emphasis added).
'Nowhere in the case is it explicitly stated that the survey report was
erroneous. However, the parties' stipulations and the opinion taken as a whole
convey the distinct impression that reliance on an inaccurate survey caused the
mislocation of the building. The first stipulation of the facts reads in part as
follows: "The plaintiffs . . . in mistaken reliance upon a surveyor's report and
plat, constructed the building . . . upon Lot No. 47 . .. believing that they
were constructing the building upon Lot 46 ... ." Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 72
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was a determining factor.23 It would appear, therefore, that im-
proper use of sufficient data may operate to deny recovery by an
improver, whereas initial lack of sufficient and accurate data would
leave the case open for further analysis.
The dissenting opinion took the position that the McKelway
case had been substantially overruled thirty years later by the Kirch-
ner case. The dissent agreed with the statement in Kirchner,24 that
the forcing of an owner of property upon which a building was
mistakenly constructed either to buy the building or to sell his
property was a taking of private property for private use25 and,
therefore, a violation of a constitutional right.26 The minority also
contended that Cautley was not realistically distinguishable from
'The improver in Cautley relied on a survey by the city engineer. Although
it is not explicitly stated in Cautley that the improver relied on an accurate
survey presented to her, and that the resulting mislocation was entirely her
own doing, there is, nevertheless, a strong implication that this was the situation.
At least it appears that this was the way the majority in Somerville interpre-
ted Cautley.
v39 N.J.Eq. 355, 358 (Ch. Ct. 1885). "The exercise of such a judicial power,
unless based upon some actual or implied culpability on the part of the party
subjected to it is a violation of a constitutional right. No tribunal has the power
to take private property for private use. The legislature itself cannot do it."
2-:There seems to be unanimous agreement that the taking of private pro-
perty for purely private use is a violation of a constitutional right. In Missouri
Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 161 U.S. 403 (1896), the Court held that the
Missouri legislature could not require a railroad corporation, which had permit-
ted the construction of two grain elevators by private citizens on its right of
way, to grant upon similar terms, a location to another group of farmers desiring
to erect a third grain elevator for their own benefit. The Court stated:
The taking by a state of the private property of one person or corpora-
tion, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is
not due process of law and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article of
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. rd. at 417.
In a later case, however, the Court seemed to recognize that all takings of pri-
vate property for private use might not be unconstitutional:
We have found nothing in the Federal Constitution which prevents the
condemnation by one person for his individual use of a right of way
over the land of another for the construction of an irrigation ditch; of
a right of way over the land of another for an adrial bucklet; or of the
right to flow the land of another by the erection of a dam.
Hairston v. Danville and Western Railway, 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).
The West Virginia Supreme Court has also held that the state constitution
forbids the taking of private property for private use. See Varner v. Martin, 21
W. Va. 534 (1883) (forbidding taking for a private road); Hench v. Pritt, 62
W. Va. 270, 57 S.E. 808 (1907) (forbidding taking for private right of way).
'The majority was of the opinion that the statement in Kirchner regard-
ing the violation of a constitutional right was only dictum, and that the only
two cases found which quoted the statement did not rely on it for disposal of
1970]
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Somerville and that the majority was in effect overruling prior case
law'
The question of which of the two innocent parties was to in-
cur the hardship undoubtedly presented a difficult question for
the court. One of the alternatives open to the plaintiff, although
not discussed by the court, would have been a suit against the
surveyor who apparently prepared the inaccurate report and plat.
2s
Of course, in order to establish liability the other party would
have to prove negligence on the part of the surveyor.2 Nevertheless,
once a surveyor's negligence has been established, it has been held
that his employer may recover damages including the cost of
removal of the building constructed on another's property in
the case. At which point a taking of private property for private use on the
basis of equitable principles becomes a violation of a constitutional right is
not dear. In a recent Washington case, Arnold v. Melani, 449 P.2d 800 (1969),
the state supreme court held that neither the state nor the federal constitution
prevented that court from awarding an easement to an improver of land who
had encroached onto the complainant's property. The state constitution specifi-
cally prohibited the taking of private property for private use except for pri-
vate ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches. The complainant had
asked the court for a mandatory injunction to force the removal of the portion
of the house the encroacher had built upon complainant's land. The court
refused the mandatory injunction and awarded the encroacher a permanent
easement. Referring to their state's constitutional provision forbidding the
taking of private property for private use the court said:
To suggest that such a provision somehow divests a court of equity of
the power to refuse a mandatory injunction would necessarily by logical
extension likewise prohibit the legislative body from establishing rules of
limitation (adverse possession) and further, would bar the passing of
title by other equitable doctrines based on negative conduct, such as
estoppel, waiver or laches.
Id. at 805. For the dissenting opinion see 450 P. 2d 815 (1969).
'Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E. 2d 805, 816 (W. Va. 1969).
'See Taft v. Rutherford, 66 Wash. 256, 119 P. 740 (1911). It could also be
argued by analogy that a surveyor should be held liable for damages resulting
from his negligence in much the same way as a register of deeds is held liable
for damages resulting from his negligence. Registers of deeds have been held
liable for damages to property owners for negligent failure to record deeds and
mortgages correctly and timely. Upton v. Slater, 83 N.J.L. 373, 85 A. 225 (1912);
Federal Land Bank v. Ginn., 106 Colo. 417, 106 P. 2d 479 (1940). In a Pennsylvania
case the court suggested that "[i]f the recorder was negligent in his duty, and
gave her a false certificate, she had doubtless her right of action for damages
against him." Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 574, 74 A. 550, 551 (1909). See
note 22 supra for a discussion of the apparently erroneous surveyor's report.
"Ferrie v. Sperry, 85 Conn. 337, 343, 82 A. 577, 579 (1912). "[T]he defendent
surveyor . . . was bound to exercise that degree of care which a skilled civil
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reliance on the erroneous survey.30 Not only may the employer
recover damages, but it also appears that an innocent third party
injured by the negligent survey may recover damages to the extent
of his injury."'
In conclusion, the court's disposal of the Somerville case on
the equity principle of unjust enrichment seems to be well sup-
ported by authority.32 The court's decision makes it dear that the
right to recover the value of improvements made in good faith on
land of another is not wholly derived from statutory authority but
also exists under equity principles independent of any statute.33 At
the same time it is arguable that other resolution of the problem
such as an action against a culpable third party (for example the
surveyor in Somerville) would lead to a more desirable result.
James R. Watson
"'raft v. Rutherford, 66 Wash. 256, 119 P. 740 (1911). Plaintiff hired de-
fendant a civil engineer, to locate the exact boundary lines to plaintiff's property.
Relying on the survey, plaintiff constructed an apartment house. The boundary
lines were inaccurrate and defendant was held liable to plaintiff for the cost
of moving the building back onto plaintiff's property. However, an important
factor in finding liability against the surveyor was his knowledge of the type of
structure plaintiff was going to build on the land.
'Huber v. Serpico, 71 N.J. Super. 329, 176 A.2d 805 (Ch. 1962). A land-
owner hired a surveyor to locate a boundary line between his property and that
of the adjacent owner. The surveyor also had the right to remove timber on
the landowner's property. The surveyor mislocated the boundary line, thereby
causing him to remove valuable trees from the adjacent owner's land. The
court allowed recovery by the adjacent owner against the surveyor.
Another alternative solution for disposition of the Somerville type situation
would be to require the plaintiff and defendant to exchange deeds to their
property. This is a simple solution when lots are adjacent and approximately
equal in value and size. Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563 (FI. 1956). Apparently
this solution was not practical in Somerville since the court cited Voss but
refrained from applying its principle. Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E. 2d 805, 811
(W. Va. 1969).
'See 2 H. Tiffany, Real Property § 625 (1939, Supp. 1969).
'Wood v. Cahill, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 38, 40, 50 S.W. 1071, 1072 (5th Dist.
1899). The West Virginia court did not cite this case, but it appears that the
Texas court succinctly stated the principle laid down in Somerville: "It is well
to bear in mind, however, that the right to recover the value of improvements
placed upon the land of another in good faith does not arise wholly upon our
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